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INTUITION, ORTHODOXY, AND  
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
John Ross Churchill
Many Christian philosophers hold that moral responsibility is incompatible 
with causal determinism, a thesis known as incompatibilism. But there are good 
reasons for resisting this trend. To illustrate this, I first examine an innovative 
recent case for incompatibilism by a Christian philosopher, one that depends 
crucially on the claim that intuitions favor incompatibilism. I argue that the 
case is flawed in ways that should keep us from accepting its conclusions. I 
then argue for a shift in the way that this issue is often approached, namely, 
that Christian philosophers should deemphasize the role of intuitions in illu-
minating this topic, and take pragmatic considerations concerning orthodoxy 
and potential empirical discoveries to favor a kind of agnosticism about the 
compatibility of determinism and responsibility.
1. Introduction
Philosophical temperaments vary. And these variations matter, as we see 
in episodes like the disagreement between James and Clifford on the ethics 
of belief. A less famous case, but one more relevant to present purposes, 
is the contrast between Sonja and Boris in the 1975 film Love and Death, as 
captured in the following exchange:
Boris: Sonja, what if there is no God?
Sonja: Boris Dimitrovitch, are you joking?
Boris: What if we’re just a bunch of absurd people who are running 
around with no rhyme or reason?
Sonja: But, if there is no God, then life has no meaning. Why go on 
living? Why not just commit suicide?
Boris: Well, let’s not get hysterical. I could be wrong. I’d hate to blow 
my brains out and then read in the paper that they found some-
thing.
Boris, unlike Sonja, is clearly a hedger by temperament. He has philosoph-
ical and theological leanings, to be sure, but he lets weighty pragmatic 
considerations temper his related commitments and actions, thereby 
shielding him from undue risk.
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I’ve introduced Boris because I believe that for many Christian philoso-
phers considering the question of the compatibility of determinism and 
moral responsibility, his strategy of withholding commitment—a kind of 
agnosticism—is a wise one.
In what follows, I’ll first spend some time looking at a recent case for 
the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility by a Christian 
philosopher. The case is an innovative, theistic variation on the manipula-
tion argument, which is commonly advanced in favor of incompatibilism. 
Careful consideration of this argument and its weaknesses will serve to 
highlight some of the ways in which incompatibilist arguments can go 
wrong, and it will present an opportunity to review some recent empirical 
evidence that intuitions do not weigh heavily in favor of incompatibilism. 
I’ll then argue for the wisdom of an alternative approach in adjudicating 
this issue. The recommended alternative relies less on intuition and favors 
a commitment to moral responsibility, coupled with a kind of agnosticism 
about its compatibility with determinism, in light of pragmatic consider-
ations concerning orthodoxy and potential empirical discoveries.
2. The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism
Katherin Rogers has recently presented an argument for the incompat-
ibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism, one that she calls 
“the divine controller argument.”1 Her case is a version of the manipula-
tion argument for incompatibilism, all versions of which attempt to show 
that causal determinism would undermine moral responsibility, because 
certain kinds of manipulation would undermine responsibility and causal 
determinism is sufficiently similar to such manipulation.2
For present purposes, causal determinism may be understood as 
the thesis that all the mental and physical events in the created order, 
including human thoughts and actions, are causally necessitated: a com-
plete description of all the mental and physical events occurring at any 
one time, together with a description of the laws of nature and the causal 
capacities of the various things that populate the world, entail a complete 
description of mental and physical goings-on at all later times.3 Crucially, 
human thoughts and actions, like all other events, are understood to be the 
effects of causal processes, and so all the causes in the series that brought 
them about are included in the entailed descriptions as well. Manipulation 
arguments, then, seek to show that there would be no moral responsibility 
if this thesis were true, because moral responsibility is undermined if it is 
manipulated in certain ways, and causally determined behavior is suffi-
ciently similar to behavior that is so manipulated. And note that the sense 
of moral responsibility at issue here is that which concerns desert; to say 
1Rogers, “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism.”
2Derk Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument is the best-known version of this challenge to 
compatibilism. See for example his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, ch. 4. 
3Here I borrow significantly from Nahmias, “Scientific Challenges to Free Will,” 346. 
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of a wrongdoer that she is responsible in this sense is to say that she is 
worthy of or deserves blame, regardless of any consequences that might 
be effected by the blame.4
Rogers’s innovation on the manipulation argument has many virtues, 
but the two that are most relevant for present purposes are these. First, 
in the crucial scenario she uses a manipulator that in certain respects 
more closely resembles causal determinism than the human manipula-
tors that are more frequently employed. In her argument, Rogers uses 
God instead of brilliant neurosurgeons, thorough brainwashers, and the 
like, which means that her manipulator need not be an intervener in the 
way that creaturely manipulators would have to be. God, as the uniquely 
powerful and knowledgeable creator and sustainer of the agent under con-
sideration, could control the agent’s behavior without “tinkering” with the 
agent’s preexisting neural structure or mental inventory. Given the divine 
attributes, God could guarantee specific behavior by operating through 
unbroken and unexceptional chains of psychological and physical causes. 
Perceptions, memories, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, resolutions, etc., 
would lead to intentions, which in turn would lead to complex behavior—
all in accord with ordinary psychological processes, and yet all proceeding 
according to divine decree. The manipulation need not involve any ad-
justment, midstream as it were, in what the agent wants, believes, values, 
remembers, etc. Because such a scenario more closely resembles agents’ 
normal behavior in a causally deterministic world—absent any manipu-
lation whatsoever—than scenarios involving neuroscientists and the like, 
Rogers is in a stronger position to argue that if the manipulation she has 
described undermines responsibility, then so also does determinism of the 
natural variety.
Second, she has by her lights used a more familiar and realistic ma-
nipulator, so that there is less danger that the intuitions elicited by the 
scenario are responding to the strangeness of the case or are irrelevant 
to real-world concerns. This may strike many people as a bizarre claim, 
given that Rogers has chosen to use a deity instead of a human actor as 
her manipulator of choice. But many theists will be apt to agree that her 
case is more realistic in this sense, because they will grant the reality of a 
God that has the power and knowledge to manipulate in this way (even 
if they deny that God would or could, all things considered, act in such 
a way).
The upshot is that Rogers presents what many will take to be a more 
realistic case of a manipulator, whose control is exercised in such a way 
that the controlled agent is very similar to an unmanipulated but causally 
determined agent—much more similar in many respects than the ma-
nipulated agents often sketched in such arguments. With this background 
in place, she argues that intuitions favor the position that agents under 
4See for example Sommers, Relative Justice, 10. See also Rogers, “The Divine Controller 
Argument for Incompatibilism,” 275, 278. 
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divine control of the sort she sketches would not be morally responsible, 
and thus—given the similarity of the two cases—neither would deter-
mined agents who are not under divine control.
Given the above, Rogers’s case that intuition privileges incompatibilism 
in this context is important, and so it is worth examining in a little more 
detail. What she takes specifically to have strong intuitive support is the 
claim that if an agent makes her choice because God causally necessitates 
her to make that choice—if God caused her to choose as she did rather 
than choosing differently—then the agent is not morally responsible for 
that choice. And thus it would not be fair for God or anyone else to blame 
or punish the agent for the choice in such a circumstance. This claim is 
defended as one that accords much more strongly with our intuitions than 
does a competing compatibilist claim (used in a modus tollens response to 
her case), namely, that an agent can be morally responsible for her choice 
even if that choice was causally determined; the two claims are not, per 
Rogers, on a par intuitively. (“Intuition” is left undefined, but we can 
plausibly and charitably assume a common usage like the following: a 
judgment about the truth or falsity of some claim, where the judgment is 
spontaneous and the person making it may not be able to offer much by 
way of further justification for it.5) Here is Rogers on this crucial point:
The premise in the divine controller argument says that if God causes your 
choice you are not morally responsible. So, for example, it just isn’t fair for 
God, or anyone, to punish you for a murder that God caused you to choose 
and commit. I take this to be an intuitive claim which is immediate (you 
see it as soon as you understand the terms), powerful, and widely accept-
ed. This intuitive strength is taken to provide strong prima facie reason to 
accept the claim. The premise in the tollens argument—although you are 
determined you can be morally responsible—certainly cannot lay claim to 
that sort of intuitive support. To be plausible at all, it must assume a fairly 
sophisticated form of compatibilism. . . . That means that when we arrive 
at the intuitively difficult conclusion that we are morally responsible—we 
deserve to be punished or rewarded—even if our choices are caused by God, our 
reason to accept the conclusion, rather than rejecting the premise, is com-
paratively weak.6
If the original intuition that you are not free and responsible when God di-
rectly causes your choices is as wide-spread and as powerful as I take it to 
be, then the divine controller argument is more persuasive than the tollens 
argument and provides good reason to adopt incompatibilism.7
It is a further virtue of the paper that Rogers makes her methodology 
so clear: the claim that divinely controlled agents aren’t responsible has 
strong intuitive support, while the claim that causally determined agents 
can be morally responsible does not; this, in conjunction with the fact 
5Sommers, Relative Justice, 11. 
6Rogers, “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism,” 286. 
7Ibid., 294.
183INTUITION, ORTHODOXY, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
that divine control is similar in relevant respects to causal determination, 
should lead us to conclude that causal determinism is incompatible with 
moral responsibility.
Rogers’s clarity enables respondents to pinpoint exactly what would 
be required for a cogent response: one must show either that the differ-
ence in intuitive support is not as Rogers has claimed—i.e., that the claim 
about divine control does not enjoy the clear intuitive advantage over the 
claim about causally determined but morally responsible agents—or one 
must show that the divine control described in Rogers’s argument differs 
in relevant respects from causal determinism. In the following sections, I 
attempt both.
3. Divine Control Versus Causal Determinism
Let’s start with some key differences between divine control and causal 
determinism, or more carefully, between the divine controller scenario as 
described in Rogers’s argument and the causally determined agency that 
it is supposed to mirror.
Recall a virtue of Rogers’s argument discussed earlier, namely, the use 
of a familiar and (for many) realistic manipulator—God—in contrast to the 
manipulators often used in similar arguments. It is to Rogers’s credit that 
she casts her manipulator in this way, that she refuses to use a manipulator 
that is a “thin” and “evanescent” philosophers’ contrivance.8 However, 
it is no less important that this same approach be used when describing 
the agent whose responsibility is in question. Otherwise we invite dangers 
parallel to those that Rogers noted could plague our thinking with respect 
to the manipulator. She worried that the use of an unrealistic and unfa-
miliar controller—the neuroscientists and brainwashers that are typically 
employed—might mean that, in the end, “weirdness is doing much of the 
heavy lifting in eliciting the looked-for intuition.”9 But it should be equally 
worrying if the agent in our scenario is significantly underdescribed. For 
in that case, the judgment that the agent is not morally responsible could 
very well be responding primarily to the fact that she lacks features that 
compatibilists defend as crucial to responsibility.
And, I submit, Rogers’s presentation of the manipulated agent is un-
derdescribed in just this way. Insufficient care has been taken to signal that 
the agent in question is normal in all relevant respects, e.g., cognitively, 
epistemically, motivationally, affectively, and so forth. Instead, what is 
most salient about the agent in the test case is that she is controlled with 
striking precision. And this means that there is a real danger that intui-
tive judgments of non-responsibility may be driven at least in part by a 
perception that we have not been presented with a genuine agent—not 
because something similar to causal determinism has undermined agency, 
8Ibid., 277.
9Ibid.
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but because the person in the scenario appears to be so simple, and in a 
way that is foreign to our ordinary experience of ourselves and others.10
Daniel Dennett gave us a memorable version of this worry for incom-
patibilism years ago by introducing the wasp Sphex, an insect that appears 
at first glance to be manifesting stunning behavioral complexity, but that 
in the end is driven (in the relevant case anyway) by a fairly simple causal 
mechanism. We may all judge that were we like Sphex in certain respects, 
we would not be responsible for our behavior. But which are the “certain 
respects” is of the utmost importance as we reflect:
Might it not be that what makes the wasp’s fate so dreadful is not that her ac-
tions and “decisions” are caused but precisely that they are so simply caused? 
If so, then the acknowledged difference between the object of our intuition 
pump [the wasp, i.e.] and ourselves—our complexity—may block our in-
heritance of the awfulness we see in the simple case.11
The lesson for present purposes is that there is a relevant difference 
between the causally determined agents that compatibilists defend as 
morally responsible, on the one hand, and the agent that has been de-
scribed in the divine controller argument, on the other. Because the latter 
is significantly underdescribed, it just isn’t clear whether intuitions elicited 
by reflection on the scenario are responding to features of the case that 
incompatibilists uniquely claim are inconsistent with moral responsibility 
(i.e., deterministic causes or something sufficiently similar) or if instead 
they are responding to the absence of features (i.e., sufficient complexity 
of the relevant sorts) that compatibilists and incompatibilists alike take to 
be essential to agency.12
The second way in which the controller scenario differs from deter-
ministic agency is more subtle but no less significant. As discussed above, 
Rogers is careful not to cast her divine controller as an intervener, so as to 
avoid such differences:
[W]hile God may be a complete divine controller, He need not be a manipula-
tor or intervener. In the divine controller argument your lack of responsibility 
10See Michael McKenna’s discussion of this point in 470–471 and 477–478 of his “Resisting 
the Manipulation Argument.” Perhaps another way of appreciating this point is to consider 
the difference in your emotional responses to the Siri of your iPhone, on the one hand, and 
the Samantha operating system of Spike Jonze’s Her, on the other. 
11Dennett, Elbow Room, 12.
12It’s true that late in “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism” (288–294), in 
her discussion of Lynne Rudder Baker’s and Al Mele’s compatibilist accounts, Rogers adds 
some agential complexity to her descriptions that renders the controlled agents so described 
more realistic. But note, crucially, that even here she takes her original intuitive judgment re-
garding the initial (simple) description to be the key bit of evidence—the proposed responses 
based on richer descriptions are judged not to succeed dialectically because they do not 
overturn that original intuition. Moreover, and as discussed in the next section in the main 
text, recent empirical evidence suggests that when people judge that controlled agents lack 
moral responsibility, they are responding to the fact that compatibilist conditions on moral 
responsibility have not been satisfied. 
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for the choice to murder cannot be ascribed to your having been mistreated, 
used, or even simply manipulated, by the controller.13
This is a major strength of Rogers’s argument, as it means that the ma-
nipulated agent better approximates ordinary, causally determined agents. 
For the latter do not have other persons “tinkering” with them like the 
frightening characters in other manipulation arguments. Nor is it true of 
determined agents that deterministic causes are somehow steering them 
away from an independence or autonomy that they otherwise would have 
had. The divine controller scenario—unlike cases where the manipulators 
are human—avoids this result as well:
Intervention and manipulation, I take it, imply that the controlled agent ex-
ists independently of the controller such that the controller must “step in” 
and tinker with the agent. Someone who intervenes or manipulates intro-
duces changes which turn the agent from the path he likely would have fol-
lowed. If we take our divine controller to be the God of classical theism—of 
Thomas Aquinas, as the prime example—then complete divine control does 
not entail any intervening per se.14
Rogers’s test case, then, is carefully constructed to ensure fidelity to the 
deterministic scenario in the two ways I have just presented. However, 
there is nevertheless a key difference between the unmanipulated agent in 
a deterministic world, on the one hand, and Rogers’s divinely controlled 
agent on the other. The compatibilist can and should insist that it is much 
clearer that the determined agent is responsible than it is that the con-
trolled agent is responsible, because it is much clearer that the determined 
agent is a cause of the right sort—i.e., that her actions are appropriately 
related causally and explanatorily to other of her mental states. And the 
reason behind this difference is Rogers’s statement concerning God’s inti-
mate, general action in the world, everywhere and all of the time:
Classical theism holds that God’s creation consists in sustaining everything 
in being from moment to moment. Absolutely every created thing that has 
any ontological status is immediately caused by God simultaneously with 
its existence. Thus nothing which is not God—no object, no positive prop-
erty, no action—exists independently of God’s directly causing it.15
My aim in raising this issue is not to contest Rogers’s theology on this 
point. Rather, I want first to highlight the fact that this aspect of the divine 
controller scenario has no analogue in the cases of causally determined 
actions that compatibilists take to be paradigms of morally responsible 
agency. It is important on compatibilist accounts that actions for which 
agents are responsible have the right kinds of mental and physical natural 
causes (and explanations in terms of these), but such accounts do not 
13Rogers, “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism,” 283. 
14Ibid., 282. 
15Ibid.
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require commitment to anything analogous to the divine cause in Rogers’s 
scenario—i.e., a direct, non-natural cause of the action that is distinct from 
that action’s natural causal history. This is a crucial point, given the kind 
of argument she has developed. And second, this distinctive feature of the 
divine controller case—that God causes, immediately and directly, the ex-
istence and properties of the controlled agent and her action—brings with 
it a risk of generating the judgments that the incompatibilist wants, but for 
the wrong reasons. For such judgments may be due to the impression that 
the agent’s mental states aren’t causing her actions after all, because God’s 
immediate and direct causation is thought to be the only causation at work 
in the scenario. It is true that Rogers clearly stipulates that natural causes 
are still operative in her divine controller scenario. And it is true that this 
stipulation—and the primary cause/secondary cause distinctions used to 
justify it—may be enough to vindicate the scenario as a possible one.16 
Nevertheless, we have been given no reason for confidence that judg-
ments about the agent’s responsibility in the divine controller scenario are 
tracking features that are present in the deterministic scenario, rather than 
tracking other features—such as the direct and immediate causation of the 
agent’s action by something other than the agent or her mental states—that 
are unique to the case of divine control.
I ended the previous section by listing the ways in which someone 
could respond to Rogers’s argument. In this section I have explored one of 
these options, by listing some crucial and relevant differences between her 
divine controller scenario and the causally deterministic scenario that it is 
supposed to resemble. This weakens her argument considerably, because 
its cogency requires these two scenarios to be similar in relevant respects. 
In light of the differences discussed above, we have good reason to doubt 
something that is essential to Rogers’s case—namely, that our judgment 
about the moral responsibility of causally determined agents ought to 
match our judgment about the moral responsibility of agents in her divine 
controller scenario.
In the next section, I explore a second line of response to further but-
tress the compatibilist’s defense, a response that challenges more directly 
Rogers’s claims about intuitive evidence.
4. Are We Intuitive Incompatibilists?
Suppose that we were able to shore up the deficiencies in the divine 
controller argument. This would require that its key scenario is not 
underdescribed, and that it presents the agent’s actions as causally and ex-
planatorily related to her mental states in appropriate ways. Suppose this 
is accomplished. Is there reason to think that proponents of this argument 
would then be in a position to claim far more intuitive support for their 
preferred conclusion—that divine control undermines responsibility—
16Ibid., 282–283. 
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than for the compatibilist’s claim that an agent can be morally responsible 
for her choice even if that choice was causally determined?
Recent empirical evidence suggests a negative answer. Consider first 
some studies by Eddy Nahmias and colleagues that sought explicitly 
to test claims about what people take to be necessary for free will and 
responsible action. They found that causal determinism is not typically 
understood to be a threat to moral responsibility unless it is conflated with 
threats to the efficacy of agents’ relevant mental states.17 In other words, 
people tend to take determinism to threaten moral responsibility only 
when they believe that determinism somehow precludes actions from 
being related causally and explanatorily to their beliefs, desires, etc. When 
it is clear that mental states play these roles, people tend to judge that 
causally determined agents can be morally responsible. This result has 
been bolstered by a more recent study,18 in which Nahmias and colleagues 
gave people fictional vignettes about neuroscientists who were able to pre-
dict a person’s everyday decisions and actions with perfect accuracy, even 
before she made the decisions or performed the actions, using knowledge 
of her past brain activity (as detected by a lightweight cap). Similar to the 
results above, the tendency was to judge that the person in the vignettes 
was responsible for her behavior. Judgments shifted only to the extent 
that people were led to believe that she could have or had been manipu-
lated by the neuroscientists; otherwise people tended to judge her to be 
responsible, despite the fact that her thought and behavior had proceeded 
deterministically.19
These results argue strongly against claims, by Rogers and others, that 
compatibilist sentiments lack intuitive strength and consensus and require 
sophisticated theory to be at all plausible. Indeed, the findings by Nahmias 
et al. suggest the opposite, i.e., that much of the folk incline toward compat-
ibilism, so long as they believe that appropriate mental states are efficacious 
and do not take the possibility of manipulation to be salient.
One might object that folk worries about manipulation create difficul-
ties for the present line of argument. Here is one way the objection might 
go: given that people tend to judge that an agent is not responsible when 
they believe that she was or could have been manipulated, they should 
share Rogers’s strong intuition that divine control (perhaps a kind of ma-
nipulation) undermines responsibility; but (we have agreed to assume in 
17See Murray and Nahmias, “Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.” 
18See Nahmias, Shepard, and Reuter, “It’s OK if ‘My Brain Made Me Do It.’” 
19One caveat here is that while the thought and behavior was said to be fully predictable, 
as above, the vignette did not include any content about laws, let alone deterministic laws. 
However, the results still support the conclusion that folk intuitions are not on the side of the 
incompatibilist, absent any worries about actual or possible manipulation. For the neurosci-
entists in the story are able to predict the agent’s behavior with perfect accuracy, based on her 
brain activity prior to the action. And this is clearly a scenario that incompatibilists in general 
will take to be hostile to responsible action, as it plausibly includes the idea that certain laws 
in conjunction with facts about the agent’s brain states at specific times jointly imply truths 
about the agent’s actions at later times. 
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this section) divine control of this sort is similar in relevant respects to 
causal determinism; therefore, people should conclude that causal deter-
minism undermines responsibility.
But there are two difficulties for this response. First, compatibilists who 
marshal Nahmias’s studies as support are entitled to claim that while it 
certainly might be the case that there is a common intuition that divine 
control of the relevant sort undermines responsibility, the evidence we 
actually have suggests that there is a common intuition that causally deter-
mined agents can be responsible, at least under certain descriptions.
Moreover, given the context, it’s worth asking why people take manipu-
lation to undermine responsibility: is it because they take manipulation 
per se to be a threat to responsibility, or are there some factors that are 
common but not essential to cases of manipulation that are generating 
the discomfort? This leads to the second difficulty for the response above. 
A separate set of studies by Chandra Sripada20 suggests that the threat 
to moral responsibility isn’t manipulation per se, but rather, manipula-
tion that results in the manipulated agent having certain psychological 
impairments. Judgments concerning two kinds of impairments, in partic-
ular, accounted for his subjects’ responses to manipulation cases. The first 
kind of impairment was one in which the agent in the studies’ vignettes 
suffered from “corrupted information”—in other words, the agent was 
a victim of a systematic and extensive program of deception and biasing 
designed to eventuate in the manipulator’s desired outcome. The second 
kind of impairment involved the manipulator giving the agent a set of 
mental states that conflicted with other, deeply held beliefs, desires, 
values, etc. that were constitutive of who that agent really was. (An ex-
ample of such a case would be a woman who has shown lifelong love and 
devotion to her grandfather, and is free from ambivalence toward him, 
but who kills him one night because a manipulator introduces a single, 
strong desire to do so.) Sripada found that his subjects’ judgments about 
whether a manipulated agent lacked free will were strongly predicted by 
their judgments about whether the agent was impaired in one of these 
two ways. Furthermore, the variation in their judgments concerning such 
impairment fully explained the variation in judgments concerning the 
manipulated agent’s freedom. His subjects, in other words, tended to take 
manipulation to threaten free will only insofar as it was judged to have 
impaired the agent in one of these ways; to the extent that the agent was 
judged not to have suffered from corrupted information or discordance 
among core commitments and the mental states the manipulator intro-
duced, manipulation was not taken as a threat to free will.21 Sripada notes 
the irony of these findings, given the history of philosophical discussion 
on this topic:
20Sripada, “What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?” 
21Ibid., 573–583. 
189INTUITION, ORTHODOXY, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Incompatibilists claim that compatibilists cannot accommodate our intu-
itions that a manipulated agent is unfree. The results of this study suggest 
that this charge against compatibilism is incorrect. These results instead 
suggest that the intuition that a manipulated agent is unfree is driven pri-
marily by judgments that the manipulated agent is compromised with 
respect to precisely the kinds of psychological capacities compatibilists 
regard as the basis for free will. Indeed, the results of the present study sug-
gest, somewhat ironically, that far from being a problem for compatibilism, 
manipulation cases might even be seen as a kind of justification for compati-
bilist views. Insofar as what drives folk intuitions in manipulation cases is 
subtle tracking of just the kind of freedom-conferring conditions that com-
patibilists have long defended, then it seems that manipulation cases pro-
vide evidence for compatibilist principles by showing these principles are 
indeed deeply enshrined in the folk conception of freedom.22
The relevance of these results to our discussion is clear. Given common 
conceptual associations between free will and moral responsibility, the 
evidence suggests that for many, manipulation by a divine controller will 
not be taken intuitively to undermine responsibility unless the manipula-
tion is understood to have resulted in one of the impairments above.23 But 
there is no reason to assume that a divine controller must exercise control 
over agents’ behavior by introducing psychic discord of the relevant sort, or 
by making agents suffer from corrupted information in the way described 
above. (Moreover, control of either kind would fail to resemble causally de-
termined agency, at least in a great many cases, and so it would not behoove 
the incompatibilist to propose manipulation of this sort.) Divine control, of 
the sort at issue here, appears not to be the threat to moral responsibility 
that it is alleged to be in Rogers’s argument.24
It’s worth pausing to note that the issue at hand, here and throughout, 
is whether the agents in question are morally responsible, in the sense 
22Ibid., 583. 
23With respect to the free will / moral responsibility distinction, it’s worth noting that Sri-
pada’s survey included a question about the agent’s moral responsibility as well. While his 
paper does not include an analysis of the relation between subjects’ responsibility judgments 
and their judgments about the relevant psychological impairments, Sripada does report the 
mean scores for this item across various conditions. These were as follows, where 1 indicated 
strong agreement that the agent was responsible and 7 strong disagreement: 1.49 (standard 
deviation = 1.2) in response to a vignette in which there was no manipulation; 2.38 (standard 
deviation = 1.5) in response to a vignette that was intended to convey that the agent was 
manipulated but did not suffer from one of the relevant impairments; and 3.16 (standard de-
viation = 1.8) in response to a vignette that included manipulation but no attempt to convey 
that there was no relevant impairment. 
24One reviewer suggested the following lesson for theological determinists who affirm 
moral responsibility, and who take Sripada’s study to heart: humans who suffer from cor-
rupted information, deep psychological discord, or a condition similar to these are not 
morally responsible, even if the condition is not due to a human manipulator. I think this is 
a reasonable conclusion to draw for those with these sensibilities, in part because it seems to 
me to align with our ordinary practices with respect to moral responsibility. For my sense is 
that we tend ordinarily to exempt agents from responsibility if they suffer from an impair-
ment like this—or perhaps better, we take responsibility to be mitigated to the extent that 
they appear to suffer from such impairment—regardless of whether we can attribute the 
condition to a human manipulator. 
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of being worthy or deserving of blame. The issue is not about the ap-
propriateness of blaming the agents, or the appropriateness of punishing the 
agents. Blameworthiness is, of course, a key factor in the determination of 
whether blame or punishment is appropriate. But it does not seem to be 
the only factor. For example, considerations of “moral standing” appear 
to be crucial in blaming practices: you may be blameworthy for your theft, 
but my hypocrisy or complicity may make it inappropriate for me to 
blame you for it. Similarly, blame of one kind may be appropriate even if 
blame of another kind is not.25 Similar comments apply to questions about 
punishment. The point is not that questions about the appropriateness of 
blame and punishment are out of place in discussions of determined or 
manipulated agency; rather, the point is that these are complex questions 
that are related to, but distinct from, the question of moral responsibility. 
This means, moreover, that we should take care not to conflate our in-
tuitions about the appropriateness of blaming or punishing the agents 
in the relevant scenarios with our intuitions about the responsibility of 
those agents.
We see, then, that even a strengthened divine controller version of the 
manipulation argument for the incompatibility of determinism and re-
sponsibility does not succeed. For its success depends heavily on claims 
about intuitions that have not borne out. Note, importantly, that the case 
for this conclusion is not that evidence like that presented above establishes 
compatibilism as having stronger intuitive support than incompatibilism. 
(This is fitting, as the question of how exactly to understand our intuitions 
on this matter is still a live one.26) Rather, such evidence calls into question 
another key element of Rogers’s argument for incompatibilism—namely, 
the twofold assumption that (i) the prospect of morally responsible, 
causally determined agency boasts little intuitive support, while (ii) the 
claim that divine control undermines moral responsibility is a strong and 
widely-shared intuition. We have seen above that there is good reason to 
doubt both.
25On the appropriateness of blame—including the relevance of blameworthiness, moral 
standing, hypocrisy, complicity, and more—see Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame”; Coates and 
Tognazzini, “The Contours of Blame”; and Coates and Tognazzini, “The Nature and Ethics 
of Blame.”
26Recent challenges to the account proposed by Nahmias and colleagues can be found 
in Rose and Nichols, “The Lesson of Bypassing,” and Knobe, “Free Will and the Scientific 
Vision.” Nahmias and Morgan Thompson respond to the latter in “A Naturalistic Vision of 
Free Will.” A recent study by Azim Shariff and colleagues might be presented as strongly 
suggesting widespread incompatibilist intuitions, as these authors report that subjects who 
read mechanistic descriptions of human action from popular science sources subsequently 
rated wrongdoers as less blameworthy than subjects who read about a different topic. (See 
Shariff et al., “Free Will and Punishment.”) However, it’s noteworthy that one of the mecha-
nistic descriptions in the study included discussion of manipulation by the scientists, and the 
other included a claim by a scientist that all our preconceptions about our minds and selves 
are “no longer safe.” In light of this, it is an open question whether the effects were due to 
reading about mechanistic agency, or were due instead to reading about manipulation or 
about a scientist’s explicit claim that empirical advances are threatening much of what we 
believe to be true of ourselves as persons. 
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5. An Alternative Approach
Rather than ending the discussion here, however, I want to suggest an 
alternative approach to this issue, one that does not prioritize claims 
about intuitions. I do so not out of a general distrust of intuitions, but 
because I believe there are good reasons for many Christian philosophers 
to downgrade their value and to weight other evidential considerations 
more heavily in this context.27
I want to begin by asking those readers who are both Christians and in-
compatibilists28 to pause to consider how, as best they can tell, they would 
respond were they to become convinced that causal determinism is true. 
Would they abandon belief in or commitment to moral responsibility? 
Perhaps some would. But I suspect that the majority would simply shift, 
quickly or gradually, to a compatibilist position.29 And for many in this 
latter group, problems that may previously have been viewed as crippling 
for compatibilism—the problem of evil, say—would come to be accepted 
as puzzles to be solved under the new approach rather than paradigm-
busting anomalies.30
These are speculative claims, of course. But there are good reasons to 
believe that people of many stripes—Christian or no—would respond in 
this way, rather than abandoning commitment to moral responsibility. The 
first reason is that work by people like Nahmias and Sripada challenges 
the claim that incompatibilism is the strong and widespread intuitive 
view that it is sometimes claimed to be. An additional reply, more spe-
cific to the case at hand, takes its cue from work in this area by Adina 
Roskies and Shaun Nichols.31 These authors found that people presented 
with a hypothetical deterministic world described abstractly—in contrast 
to the concrete descriptions used in the studies by Nahmias and Sripada—
tended to judge that moral responsibility is impossible in such a world. 
However, when people were given instead a script that presented the 
actual world as deterministic, in the very same abstract way, they were 
27This is not to deny that there are considerable prima facie challenges to the evidential 
value of intuitions concerning moral responsibility. See for example Tamler Sommers’s case 
that such intuitions differ radically across cultures in Relative Justice, Part I, a conclusion that, 
if correct, would at least problematize the practice of counting the intuitions typical of one’s 
culture as normative. But see Fiery Cushman’s response to one of these proposed differences 
(belief in individual moral responsibility versus belief in collective moral responsibility) in 
his “Revenge without Responsibility?” 
28This will constitute a large majority of Christian philosophers, according to Jerry Walls 
in his “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compati-
bilist,” 78. 
29See van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 219–221, for an example of an incompatibilist 
who is especially frank on this matter. 
30Moreover, some problems in Christian philosophy would become easier to solve, such 
as the problem of reconciling human free will and divine foreknowledge (assuming that 
morally responsible agency requires free will). Lynne Rudder Baker makes this point, and 
gives other considerations in favor of compatibilism within a Christian framework, in her 
“Why Christians Shouldn’t Be Libertarians.” 
31Roskies and Nichols, “Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth.”
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inclined to judge that agents were morally responsible (despite being 
causally determined). This, too, suggests that people would not abandon 
commitment to moral responsibility en masse were they to become con-
vinced that the world—their world—was deterministic, even if they report 
incompatibilist intuitions under certain conditions.
However, for present purposes I’m less interested in how people in 
general would respond in these circumstances, and more interested in 
how Christian philosophers, in particular, should be prepared to respond. For 
I think that reflection on this issue ultimately reveals a kind of agnosticism 
about the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility to be a 
wiser strategy than commitment to incompatibilism, for many Christian 
philosophers.
To see this, consider first that while there are philosophical positions 
that would plausibly put one outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy 
broadly defined, compatibilism is definitely not one of these positions. 
(Quite the contrary in fact, as several eminent figures in the history of 
the church have defended positions that allow for causally determined, 
morally responsible agency, or positions that are sufficiently similar in 
relevant respects.32) The same, however, cannot be said of positions that 
reject moral responsibility, as such responsibility is much more central 
to orthodoxy. This is explicit in the confessional statements of multiple 
traditions, and it is plausibly included in many (even if not all) others.33 
Moreover, determinism, like certain other theses about causal structure 
that many incompatibilists see as threats to responsibility, admits of em-
pirical confirmation or disconfirmation;34 it remains a live possibility that 
the sciences find compelling evidence for the truth of determinism (or 
32Augustine, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards, for example, all defended views of 
moral responsibility that make it difficult to oppose compatibilism of the sort at issue here. 
For each of their accounts rejects some central plank of incompatibilism, whether that plank 
is the condition that one was able to act otherwise than one acted in fact (the “leeway” condi-
tion) or that one was the ultimate source of one’s action (the “sourcehood” condition). On 
the leeway/sourcehood distinction, see Levy, Hard Luck, ch. 3. For evidence that Augustine 
held a view that was friendly to compatibilism in the way I have suggested, see Couenhoven, 
Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ, Part One. For evidence that Calvin held such a view, see 
Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas, ch. 6, and Calvin at the Centre, ch. 8. Edwards’s commitments in this 
respect can be seen in his Freedom of the Will. 
33See for example Article 9 of The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion (in Packer and Beckwith, 
The Thirty-Nine Articles, 8–9); ch. XV, sec. 4 of The Westminster Confession of Faith (in Hodge, 
The Westminster Confession, 213); and sec. 1732 in The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 481. 
Please note that I am not claiming that those who reject moral responsibility are beyond the 
pale theologically. (I cannot emphasize this enough.) Rather, I am only making the point—an 
uncontroversial one, in my opinion—that the rejection of moral responsibility is difficult to 
square with Christian orthodoxy, broadly construed, while commitment to compatibilism is 
not. On this point, see Crisp, Deviant Calvinism, ch. 3, especially 77.
34It’s worth a mention in this context that there are weighty arguments against deter-
minism that do not turn primarily on an appeal to quantum mechanics. For examples, see 
Dupré, The Disorder of Things, ch. 8 and ch. 9, and Human Nature and the Limits of Science, ch. 
1 and ch. 7, as well as Cartwright, The Dappled World, Part I. 
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these other theses, for that matter).35 But these considerations, taken to-
gether, show us that the stakes are high for Christian incompatibilists—at 
least for those Christian incompatibilists who are prepared to maintain 
their incompatibilism upon learning that determinism is true. For such 
persons have made their commitment to such responsibility hostage to 
empirical discoveries. And thus they are betting a secure place within the 
bounds of orthodoxy on the proposition that determinism is false, despite 
the fact that there is wide consensus that the truth of this thesis is not 
precluded by orthodoxy.
But for many—perhaps most—Christian philosophers, such a bet will 
be extremely unattractive, as security within orthodoxy will be valued 
much more highly than maintaining commitment to incompatiblism. For 
someone in this camp, the wiser strategy will be to take the wager off 
the table by withholding commitment on whether determinism rules out 
morally responsible agency,36 and then issuing strong reservations if they 
apply in one’s case—e.g., qualifications that such agency seems counterin-
tuitive, that such a scenario appears to exacerbate the problems of evil or 
hell, and so forth, as one sees fit.37 The result would be a robust commit-
ment to moral responsibility relative to potential scientific discoveries that 
implicate human agency, a position that would mark a virtuous contrast 
to episodes within church history in which empirical theses were invested 
with undue doctrinal significance.
35Many incompatibilists, for example, would contest the claim that an agent who is 
merely overwhelmingly likely (95 %, e.g.) to perform every action she in fact performs would 
be morally responsible for those actions. Similarly, it is not uncommon for some incompati-
bilists to argue that if agency has a probabilistic event-causal structure, then no one is morally 
responsible for their behavior. (For presentation and response to the latter kind of argument, 
see Franklin, “Farewell to the Luck [and Mind] Argument.”) In principle, empirical tests 
should be able to reveal whether probabilities can be assigned to our choices, and if so, the 
degree to which each of our actions was likely to be performed. As for whether or not agency 
is event-causal, empirical evidence for or against will be less straightforward. However, I 
take the following to be plausible but not uncontroversial: the more that agency lends itself 
to mechanistic explanations in the psychological and brain sciences, the more difficult it is to 
square with agent-causal or non-causal accounts as opposed to event-causal accounts. For 
event-causal accounts are not hostile to mechanistic agency in the way that these other two 
approaches appear to be. If this is right, advances in mechanistic explanations of agency 
would count in favor of the event-causal approach, and thus—for those who have advanced 
the luck argument—against moral responsibility. On mechanism as a perceived threat to 
moral responsibility, see Nahmias, “Scientific Challenges to Free Will,” 346–348, and Vargas, 
“If Free Will Doesn’t Exist, Neither Does Water,” 193. 
36Readers may recognize the similarity of this sentiment to one of John Martin 
Fischer’s stated motivations for compatibilism in his “Problems with Actual-Sequence In-
compatibilism,” 323. Fischer himself counts these motivations as Strawsonian, in light of P. 
F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 1–28. The difference is that I am proposing that Chris-
tian incompatibilists do not only hold their commitment to moral responsibility hostage to 
scientific discovery, but—in virtue of this—their security within the bounds of orthodoxy 
as well.
37These qualifications reflect the chief difficulties for compatibilism in Walls’s “Why No 
Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist.”
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I refer to this position as agnosticism in part because of its similarity to a 
view defended by Alfred R. Mele, a position he calls agnostic autonomism.38 
Mele’s approach is characterized by a firm commitment to moral respon-
sibility and a noncommittal attitude on the compatibility question. He 
takes both compatibilism and incompatibilism to be live options without 
accepting either, and he is more confident that either compatibilist condi-
tions or incompatibilist conditions on responsibility are met than he is that 
humans are never morally responsible.
My argument takes a different route to a similar view: for many 
(perhaps most) Christian philosophers, there is good reason to favor com-
mitment to moral responsibility and agnosticism on the compatibility 
question. For this position enables one to avoid staking one’s security 
within the bounds of orthodoxy on the proposition that determinism (or 
related empirical theses) is false—an especially wise strategy given that 
the truth of determinism appears to be safely within these bounds. And 
this strategy, note, is intended even for Christians with strong incom-
patibilist intuitions. For the bet on incompatibilism will, for many, be bad 
enough that such intuitions should be given relatively little weight, as 
should the costs of having to revise key incompatibilist concepts in sig-
nificant ways.39 Moreover, for those who have incompatibilist intuitions 
but nevertheless suspect that decisive evidence for determinism would 
not (or should not) shake their commitment to moral responsibility, such 
agnosticism would provide an alternative to simply accepting incompati-
bilism with the knowledge that they would likely reject it upon learning 
that determinism is true.
Two qualifications are in order before we proceed. First, the argument 
above is targeted at philosophers who identify with a Christian tradition 
within which moral responsibility approaches something of a sine qua 
non, and within which compatibilism concerning determinism and moral 
responsibility is treated as within the bounds of orthodoxy. Where this is 
not the case, the argument has little force. Since I expect that a great many 
Christian philosophers will count themselves as within the target class, I 
do not view this as a substantial weakness.
Second, there may be Christian philosophers whose commitment to 
incompatibilism is so strong that they wish to be stricter than tradition 
on this issue. That is, while they believe that orthodoxy countenances 
determined, morally responsible agency, they simply cannot bring them-
selves to do so, and thus they knowingly and willingly stake their security 
within the bounds of orthodoxy on the falsity of determinism. Obviously 
38See Mele, Free Will and Luck, 4–5. Note that Mele explicitly casts his view as one that 
concerns both moral responsibility and free will, while I have limited my brief discussion of 
his approach to issues about moral responsibility. 
39For defense of revisionism as a viable strategy in this and related inquiry, see Vargas, “If 
Free Will Doesn’t Exist, Neither Does Water.” Note, however, that Vargas is not concerned 
with theological issues in his paper. 
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such people will not be moved by my case that incompatibilism is a bad 
bet. And I don’t have an argument that demonstrates their evaluation 
of the bet to be mistaken or irrational. (It’s probably fair to say that the 
natural bent of the Christian philosopher is to take orthodoxy as Austin 
took ordinary language—i.e., as the first word, on the subject, but not 
the last.40) Regardless, here again I expect that this class of people will be 
small enough—especially in light of the findings by Roskies and Nichols, 
Sripada, and Nahmias et al. discussed earlier—that the argument above 
should still have sufficiently wide application.
Given the role that intuition is often afforded in philosophy, there may 
be some dissatisfaction that I have given no account as to how in general 
we ought to think of intuitions as evidence in the philosophical domain. 
I’ll just note that while it might be preferable to have some such account, 
none is needed to make the case above. It’s probably also worth noting 
that Christian philosophers are already in the business of reprioritizing 
or reinterpreting intuitions and revising concepts accordingly, in virtue 
of accepting doctrines like the Trinity and the hypostatic union, and thus 
there is a kind of precedent for doing so in the present case.41
Finally, note that I’ve presented agnosticism as an alternative to incom-
patibilism. This is in keeping with my primary aim in the present paper. 
However, clearly considerations similar to those I’ve presented above 
weigh just as strongly against commitment to the kind of compatibilist 
position that requires causal determinism for moral responsibility, as one 
finds in (e.g.) the work of Jonathan Edwards.42 For that kind of position 
makes moral responsibility hostage to the truth of determinism. The case 
above does not weigh as strongly against compatibilism in the strict (and 
weaker) sense—i.e., the thesis that responsibility is compatible with, but 
does not require, causal determinism—because this weaker thesis doesn’t 
stake as much on the truth or on the falsity of such determinism. But 
neither does the case recommend, let alone require, commitment to this 
weaker kind of compatibilism. So it is, in the end, properly understood as 
an argument for agnosticism.
6. Conclusion
As Love and Death draws to a close, we get this exchange between Boris 
and his father:
40Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” 11. 
41Interestingly, there is evidence that garden-variety theistic commitments (e.g., divine 
omnipresence) and more intuitive, anthropomorphic conceptions of God (e.g., as spatially con-
strained) are held simultaneously in the minds of adult theists—the former explicitly, the latter 
implicitly—manifesting themselves respectively in different kinds of situations. This suggests 
that even these apparently tamer theological concepts, while explicitly affirmed, are competing 
daily with more intuitive alternatives. See Barrett and Keil, “Conceptualizing a Nonnatural 
Entity,” and McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 210–219, for discussion. 
42See for example Part II, sec. X of Edwards’s Freedom of the Will. 
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Boris: I have no fear of the gallows.
Father: No?
Boris: No. Why should I? They’re going to shoot me.
Just as Boris reasonably lacks some fears and harbors others, so also the 
position I’ve defended recommends to many Christian philosophers that 
they worry less about some alleged threats to moral responsibility—but 
not about all such threats. That is, I have not made the claim that Chris-
tian commitments with respect to moral responsibility can appropriately 
be insulated from every criticism. Imagine, for example, that we were to 
discover that contrary to appearances, many of our apparently morally 
significant actions are performed for reasons of which we are not con-
sciously aware, and moreover, that these reasons are of a sort that were we 
to learn of them we would not endorse them as relevant reasons for our 
behavior.43 Christian philosophers should seek to identify and evaluate 
potential challenges of this more direct sort, regardless of their stance on 
the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility.44
Similarly, what we now know about the nature and effects of various 
psychological disorders raises serious questions about whether and to 
what extent those affected are responsible for their behavior—disorders 
like psychopathy, mania, clinical depression, certain types of Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, and more. Given the multifaceted significance of 
such questions, Christian philosophers should increasingly bring their 
resources to bear here as well.45
In the preceding, I have tried to show that compatibilism has little to 
fear from certain arguments, insofar as these seek to elicit or appeal to 
intuitions that tell against the compatibility of causal determinism and 
moral responsibility. But I’ve also argued that this strategy for guiding 
commitment on this issue will be a poor one for many Christian philos-
ophers. These persons will not wish to wager their security within the 
43See Nahmias, “Scientific Challenges to Free Will,” 353–354, for discussion of this and 
similar challenges to morally responsible agency. For a careful discussion of many proposed 
threats to such agency, see Mele, Effective Intentions and A Dialogue on Free Will and Science.
44It’s worth noting that Christian B. Miller has modeled this kind of approach to multiple 
issues in moral psychology in a recent paper in this journal, “Should Christians Be Worried 
About Situationist Claims in Psychology and Philosophy?” In that paper, Miller articulates 
and responds to a challenge to moral responsibility within a Christian framework that turns 
on the fact that much of our behavior is influenced by situational factors that activate “sur-
prising” mental dispositions—surprising in the sense that we are typically unaware of their 
influence, or of the extent of their influence, on our behavior. He also argues for a kind 
of skepticism about our reasons for forming moral judgments in cases in which we don’t 
consciously deliberate before making such judgments; since such cases are fairly common, 
and ordinary practice (among many Christians and non-Christians alike) seems to assume 
knowledge of our reasons in these cases, his conclusion is a highly revisionist one. 
45For an example of careful philosophical inquiry into such questions, see Shoemaker, 
Responsibility from the Margins. Note that Shoemaker’s approach demonstrates the way in 
which a better understanding of moral responsibility in these and other atypical cases may 
ultimately illuminate the nature of human moral responsibility generally. 
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bounds of orthodoxy on the falsity of an empirical thesis, especially when 
that thesis is one that is not widely taken to be inconsistent with ortho-
doxy in the first place. For these Christian philosophers—and I suspect 
there are many—agnosticism is to be preferred.46
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